Résumé
Ethnicity and ethnic conflicts are phenomena usually associated with urban settings. In urban areas the ethnic symbol, like the religious, can easily be manipulated by members of the ruling class. And it may therefore be essential to explain why under certain socio-political conditions like multipartism in Cameroon, ethnic conflict has become a more appealing tool of political mobilization. The reason is obvious. At independence Cameroon cornered itself into rejecting ethnicity as an organizing concept for national integration and nation-building. But, according to Africanist scholars1 there are four principal ways in which ethnicity serves to aid national integration. First, ethnic groups tend to assume some of the functions of the extended family and hence they diminish the importance of kinship roles, two, ethnic groups serve as a mechanism of resocialization, three, ethnic groups help keep the class structure fluid, and so prevent the emergence of castes; fourth, ethnic groups serve as an outlet for political tensions. However, Cameroon has a bewildering diversity in terms of ethnic composition, geographical diversity, economic and religious diversity.2 This diversity explains why "vivid flames of (ethnic) violence and division have been quenched but it appears fire is still smouldering under the ashes".3 And Cameroon is today ethnically a runaway state because "a whole is not a mere addition of its component parts".4 Hence, the concern of this study is to answer the following questions. First, what institutional set ups and ethnic social patterns were shaped and moulded by the German, French and English colonial administrations? Second, how did the post-colonial state manage the colonial inheritance of ethnic cleavages of democratization on ethnic complexities? Four, what are the alternative futures for the ethnic nationalities question in Cameroon? The argument of this paper is therefore that the ethnic question in Cameroon is a colonial inheritance maintained by the neocolonial political economy. And the vicious and eventful transition to democracy has instead fueled and exacerbated ethnic conflicts. It appears the period of German rule reminds many Cameroonians of "a half-mythical golden age when the Cameroons were one".5 This oneness was that of territory, not of people. The Germans applied the twin principles of Indirect Rule and divide-and-rule to administer Cameroon. For instance, in the case of Douala, it was clear in German circles "that if Ndumbe (King Bell) and Dika (King Akwa) were living peacefully, the Germans will not have the possibility of imposing themselves on the Dualas, that is why he (Governor Soden) does nothing to bring peace in the country."6 German colonial administrators also connived with friendly chiefs to govern their people. The case of Fon Galega of Bali was a neat example of cooperation which gave birth to the 1891 Treaty between Zintgraff and Fon Galega. German administrators adopted the "Bali Strategy" in the Ewondo and Bane areas to create and enforce a central authority among the Ewondo and Bane. Charles Atangana7 was the chief indigenous collaborator. In North Cameroon, the German colonial administration militarily aided lamidos (muslim traditional rulers) in their drive to islamise the non-muslim population and to subdue their neighbours. This explains why German policy towards the Kirdis as well as the mandaras consisted of putting them under the Fulbes8. The colonial use of traditional authorities is put succinctly by Judge Staehler in 1907 as follows: At independence, and reunification in 1961, the new governments had inherited both British and French institutional set ups and social patterns. These were shaped and moulded by colonial administrations along ethnic lines and cleavages. Institutions were structured corresponding to ethnic clusters and lines. Organization
of social production was transformed in such a way that favoured the advancement
of certain ethnic groups, while other ethnic groups were turned into labour
reservoirs supplying labour in large plantations. The colonial education
system consolidated further the ethnic identities. The reason is that
opportunities to education were availed more to the relatively westernized
groups than to others. Above all, colonial administrations had pursued
deliberate policies which sought to promote and consolidate the diverse
ethnic identities rather than forge them. In sum, colonial legacies on
ethnic identities had left its imprint which had implicated the ethnic
question after independence. Economic crises and National Unity The economic crises have blown the lid off the rhetorics of national unity and development. The naked reality is that the economic crises have revealed that no real and sustained unity and development have occurred since independence. But meanwhile Cameroonians have lost their political freedom as well due to what Mballa Barnabe referred to as "odious, brutal, and bloody repression" (Johnson, 1970:248). This realization marks the beginning of a re-awakening of politics. This re-awakening follows the participation "in the suicide of democracy" by most Cameroonians. They endorsed Ahidjo's creation of a single-party: Undoubtedly, this demand took different forms. This is explanable because democracy does not mean the same thing to all social classes, status and ethnic groups in Cameroon. This is exemplified by the resolutions of the joint meeting of the so-called moderate and radical opposition groups which held in Yaounde on March 22, 1995. The resolutions, inter alia, insisted that Cameroon's constitution "must spell out the separation of powers between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary". The opposition leaders' sensitivity to questions of elections compelled them to call on the government to create "an independent electoral commission and redraw the electoral register". However, Cameroonian indigenous ethnic groups have emerged as significant elements in the political divisions of the country. That is to say, ethnic affiliations are linked to political groupings or factions or portions, and are often linked to occupational categories. And they are surely linked to job allocation. This is why individuals have been aligned and/or mobilized on ethnic lines for political ends (Rothschild, 1969, Rotherg, 1967; Lewis, 1958, Mentan, 1994). This alignment and/or mobilization of ethnic affiliations appear (Akiwowo, 1964:162) as "a set of patterned responses, adaptive adjustments if you will, to the unanticipated consequences of the process of nation-building." In the words of Skinner (1967:173), the central function of ethnic affiliations is "to permit people to organize into social, cultural or political entities able to compete with others for whatever goods and services (are) viewed as valuable in their environment." Nevertheless, one would hasten to agree with Wallerstein (1971:220) that behind the ethnic "reality" lies a class conflict, not very far from the surface. In Cameroon,
the competition has been pitched between the depoliticization of the masses
which constitutes the politics of the ruling class and the politicization,
radicalization and militarization of ethnic groups by the threatened ruling
class, and the opposition in the wings. Here lies the dilemmas in the
democratization process. And these dilemmas compel Cameroonians to wonder
whether democracy is really worth so much anxiety and uncertainty (Schmitter,
1994:65-66). Boundaries and Identities Democratic competition and/or cooperation demand a reliable idea of who the political actors are and what will be the physical limits of their playing field. The National Executive Committee member of the Social Democratic Front, Dr. Njakwa raised some of these issues in his interview with Radio France International on March 19, 1995. He observed that (1) Cameroon's Parliament had gone from being a rubber-stamp for the government to a complete non-Parliament; (2) the country no longer had a civil society; (3) there was a general clampdown on trade unions; and, hence, (4) it was virtually impossible for the opposition to develop a political strategy. That is, there must be a prior legitimate political unit as an overriding requisite. It is in this sense that the boundaries and identities constituting what is commonly called "nationality" are relevant. Unfortunately, what constitutes a nation is not quite clear in Cameroon. The subject of national identity and boundaries has become a subject of manipulation. And pressured democratization itself seems to encourage political actors to manipulate the principle of "nationality" in order to create ethnic constituencies favourable to their survivalist politics. Donald Horowitz (1993:21-22) holds that in many African countries leaders preside over a government dominated by their ethnic groups. Examples are Moi, Eyadema, Kerekou, Kaunda and now Chiluba, etc. As for Cameroon, he notes with an apparent bit of exaggeration, President Biya's government is "supported mainly by the Beti and Bulu and opposed by all the rest." But such manipulations fail to resolve the issue of deciding what a Cameroon nation and its corresponding political units should be. A glaring example is the abolition of the name United Republic of Cameroon and replaced by La République du Cameroun as per law NO. 84-001 of 4/2/84. The legal issue here is that La République du Cameroun is the name French Cameroon adopted on accession to independence on January 1, 1960. Such change in name signified secession by La République du Cameroun from the United Republic of Cameroon. Hence, the continued domination of the English-speaking part of the country by the secessionist La République du Cameroun was viewed as outright annexation. The legal case has been put succinctly by Barrister Gorji Dinka (1985:3-4) thus: Since the revived Republic of Cameroon (had) not yet set up its own institutions, it (had) neither a government nor a legislature nor any other institution of administration. So ... Biya (was) neither President of the (abolished) United Republic of Cameroon ... nor of newly revived Republic of Cameroon. Another
case worth discussing is the systematic "discrimination in the registration
of voters' as recorded in The Herald No. 223 of July 1995. The
paper reports that in villages and quarters perceived as opposition strong-holds
the Civil Administrators register mostly voters considered as sympathisers
of the ruling-CPDM and reject the rest. Thus there is growing evidence
that the ruling party and the administration have a mandate to disenfranchise
the opposition against the up-coming local council elections. Corruption and Political Decay All democracies are subject to the abuse of power and the appropriation of public good for private benefits. These evils are held in check by the periodic opportunity citizens have to go to the polls and "throw the rogues out." But in Cameroon the dilemma lies in the professionalization of politics. "Democratic" politicians are not well-to-do and positions are highly remunerated. Many have no other source of income; and the costs of getting oneself elected and servicing one's constituents make democratic politics prohibitively high. This high cost easily opens the doors to the ethnicization of politics. The explosive demonstration of this phenomenon finds a perfect illustration in the news media. According to Banock (1992:240) during the 1992 Presidentials two ethnic groups were involved in a bitter and cut-throat struggle for power. Each sought the aid of allies and used whatever resources at their disposal to achieve their aim by outwitting, outclassing and outmanoeuvreing the other. These groups were the Betis and Bamilekes. The Betis, according to him, were n the CPDM and monopolized the national official or state media despite legislative provisions to the contrary. The government went ahead to suspend newspapers favourable to the Bamileke opposition epitomized by the S.D.F. These newspapers were Le Messager, La Nouvelle Expression and Challenge Hebdo. Government failed in its suspension and seizures of these papers which circumvented the arrêtés through changes in their names. Pro-government papers as Le Patriote and Le Témoin joined in the "war". CRTV-Centre even issued communiques calling on the Betis to prepare for an impending ethnic Armageddon. Banock's fear lies in the likely degeneration into a violent conflict of the Yugoslavian type where Serbes and Croates are battling it out. Behind these pseudo political parties the elites of both ethnic groups are the faces behind the masks. The problem, according to the ethnic protagonists, is "the mobilization, the exacerbation of passions, the reciprocal 'diabolisation' of each ethnic group. Le Patriote No. 87 of 1991 accused the Bamilekes of their "determination" and "devotion to finish once and for all with the Betis and their 'big' brother Paul Biya." The democratization process in Cameroon was born in a burst of civic enthusiasm and moral outrage against the corrupt and inept (decadence) of the single-party system. The dilemma of professionalization of politics thus emerged later with devastating consequences since crisis-hit Cameroonians were not convinced of the need to pay politicians generously. Nevertheless, the politicians with no secure sources of income feed ostentatiously fat on the public treasury. The concept of politics as a farm where one reaps without sowing makes any threatening action by the opposition to attract government violence. For example, the sum of CFA 440 million was paid out by the state to Bulu military officers in 1992 to: (a) pay selected criminals and provide them with guns so that they could implicate John Fru Ndi for sending them to buy from Nigeria; (b) burn the property or CPDM stalwarts in the North West Province and the crimes attributed to the SDF to facilitate its banning on grounds of armed rebellion against state institutions; and (c) precipitate an incident for either the killing or arrest and trial of the Chairman in a "Ndongmo style." The money was paid to four Bulu lieutenants by the Minister of Finance on instructions from the Presidency of the Republic. Payment voucher No. B834876 or the amount of 150,000,000 frs was paid to Lt. Tsala Engama Joseph. Three other payment vouchers Nos. B834880, B834881 and B834882 for the sums of 120,000,000, 120,000,000 and 50,000,000 were paid to Lt. Ndongo Ebode, Lt. Debi Pierre and Lt. Ossongo Ada respectively on November 6, 1992. These four military officers were thus sent to Bamenda with a special crack force which received instructions directly from Yaounde since the military commander in Bamenda, Colonel Pom Guillaume could no longer be trusted. This story was published in SDF-ECHO No. 009 of November 23, 1992 but was never countered by the government whose penchant for refutations is legend. Understandably,
Cameroonians tend to view politicians apathetically as unsparing rogues
whose political parties, the remuneration of deputies, the extraction
of fees-for-service, and the profiting from government contracts are murky
and repugnant. And incumbent politicians bound to change toward "unleashing
market forces" ensure that the process offers very juicy opportunities
for illicit enrichment through selling off enterprises, awarding of contracts,
etc. External and Internal Insecurity The democratization process does not guarantee national security. Cameroon's size, resources, strategic location and ethnic composition even make it worse. Furthermore, Cameroon has suffered from great domestic insecurity in the changeover to democracy: high crime rates, increases in political violence, and frequent disruptions of basic services to redefine the identity of the political unit. A typical example of looming domestic insecurity lies in cameroon's Anglophone/Francophone history itself. Anglophones are apparently disenchanted with their "second class citizenship". Conscious of this growing discontent already articulated at the United Nations, the Government is desperately, using other Anglophones to counter what it deems "secession." Both North West/South West pro-government delegations to both provinces are viewed as: impostors, unrecognized leaders, emissaries of the La Republique du Cameroon secessionist and annexationist state, agents of divide-and-rule by their benefactors so that they can be separately fleeced of their dignity and bargaining powers on behalf of Southern Cameroons, token figures and meaningless showpieces, deceived and blinded errand boys who fail to see the annexation, assimilation, subjugation and marginalization of Anglophones and belligerent groups teleguided by La République. At the centre of the security dilemma lies the delicate issue of civil-military, civil-gendarmerie and civil-police relations. This dilemma is acute because the transition is facing the issue of (a) extricating the armed forces from power; (b) meeting out justice or crimes committed both during the ancien regime's tenure and the transition; and (c) giving the soldiers a satisfactory and credible role under democratic auspices. These issues originate from the overarching ambition of the government to control members of the Cameroonian society minutely. To achieve this thorough control a repressive machinery is necessary for imposing constraints, exactions, terror and coercion. The agents of this machinery are omnipresent, brutal, uncontrollable and benefit from unconstitutional immunities. The overdeveloped state apparatus comprises omnipresent agents for maintaining law and order. They represent some 30% of "public servants." That is, they are 40,000 out of 130,000. These forces are made up of "the internal security which falls under the shared responsibility of the national police, intelligence service, the gendarmerie, military intelligence (SEMIL), the Army as well as the Presidential Guardsmen" as presented by a Report by the U.S. State Department of February 1, 1995. Le Nouvel Indépendant of June 1994 was thus not exaggerating by pointing to the ever-deteriorating relations between the armed forces and civilians, as well as a reduction of social protection and security of citizens which are government infatuated with political power fails to see this as a priority. Thus, between Douala and Tiko which is obviously less than 100 kms. one may be subjected to vicious police checks in at least eight places. One normally experiences similar mixed police, gendarme and army squads in at least 15 places between Ebolowa and Yaounde. The bribe offered by transporters is irrespective of the completeness of their travelling documents. Institutionalization of armed intimidation is another strategy for the preservation of class/ethnic rule. This takes singularly the form of the maintenance of law and order in Cameroon. It is done by the use of: (a) the police, gendarmerie, and military to arrest, torture or kill those who violate the laws of the state decreed by the ruling class; (b) the "judiciary" to pass judgement on them and determine their punishment; and (c) the prisons to incarcerate them. This system explains why "tension management" is invariably linked to the inflated use of force. Moreover, the "civilian" government is assailed with competing demands from myriad newly enfranchised groups, border conflicts and internal insurrections. Though the government is simultaneously following structures to cut budget imbalances, implement austerity measures, and privatize public enterprises, the military is an unlikely place for cuts. The mission of the military remains unchanged: combatting drug traffic, policing common crime, repressing social unrest and combatting militant political opposition groups. Establishing
control over the gendarmerie and the police poses delicate choices. On
the one hand, there is the enhanced need for policing due to the increase
in crime--even those sponsored and perpetrated by the regime. On the other,
there is the illusionary expectation that the police will respect due
process of law and basic human rights. It is new subversive of trust in
Cameroon institutions and the legitimacy of the government because of
the popular perception that "things have gone worse" at the level of face-to-face
contacts between police authorities and the population. The inflated investment
in civilian control tends to undermine not only the regime's legitimacy
but the authority of the state itself. Overload and Ungovernability Democracies are not anarchies. They must be capable of governing, of using public authority to modify the behaviour of individual citizens. However, one of the enduring mysteries of Cameroon's "advanced democracy" is their lack of a source of political obligation. Why do Cameroonians generally disobey the law and pursue their demands through irregular institutional channels, even when there might seem to be a greater playoff and little fear of punishment from doing otherwise. The usual answers rest on such abstractions as "lack of democratic tradition", "absence of trust in institutions", "lack of political socialization", "lack of civil culture", "absence of a legitimate government", etc. Unfortunately, one is not told the origins of the "lacks." And the "lacks" give no comfort to those concerned with democratizing a society rapidly. President Biya does not lack grand designs. These designs are contained in his "New Deal Package" (Ngoh, 1997:317). With regard to his political ideals on his accession to power, Biya called for a greater liberalization and democratization of the Cameroon society. By liberalization, he meant the 'freedom of thought and of speech, factor of creativity through the development and discussion of ideas... (the) liberalization for all social classes and all Cameroonians ..." By democratization, Biya meant "a ruling democracy which is truly authentic but orderly, peaceful and effective." He also meant that "the leaders and representatives of the state and of the party, at all levels, will be freely elected from among several candidates by citizens or militants." In his economic ideals, Biya called for rigour, integrity and moralisation in the conduct of all public and private activities. Regarding his social ideals, the president called for social justice which meant the redoubling and extension of housing facilities, public transport, health and social insurance as well as the increase in salary scales and prices of staple products. Today, Cameroonians do not need to strain to understand the opportunistic and hopeless nature of these "ideals" of the "New Deal Package." Cameroon is being viewed as the "Haiti of Africa," intervention which makes things right. Despite often desperate claims by government ministers that Cameroon is democratizing, the fact is that Biya's regime has created obstacles to freedom and democracy. His vehement reluctance to liberalize laws has resulted in economic disaster, with rising unemployment especially the mass of semi-intellectualized unemployment due to the lack of job opportunities for graduates, rampant inflation, persistent strikes by both the public and private sector workers, odious cuts in wages for civil servants and growing domestic and external debt. In fact, the prestigious London-based Economic Intelligence Unit gave Cameroon its lowest rating for credit worthiness among African countries in 1994. On a rating scale from "A" to "E", Cameroon scored an "E", putting it in the same category as war-town Angola, the collapsed civil society of Zaire and Abacha's resurgent dictatorship in Nigeria. The trouble with Cameroon is that its citizens are very mobile (rural-urban), educated, disaffected, cynical and sceptical of the government. Their cynicism derives from the fact that foreign mass communications have made them more aware of events at home and abroad than their gagged media in the country. They have also acquired alternative means for pursuing their interests and passions. Hence the shift away from political parties as the exclusive intermediaries for citizens and the primary source of legitimacy since the intense ethnicization of political parties in the 1990s. They are particularly important in expressing interests and passions which motivate these groups to participate with formidable organizational skills and with special intensity. This trend makes it difficult for political parties still to provide the principal linkage between citizens and government, and it is unlikely that the choice of rules and institutions formally involved bargaining among political parties. Threats and ethnic villanization is not new. In an article "Le Tribalisme Triomphant et provocateur" Le patriote No. 71 of May 31, 1991, claimed that Bamilekes will "descend" on the heads of Betis when they wind power through free elections. In a letter of threat to Mono Ndzana and "his ethnic group" a certain Bamileke medic in Lille, France, referred to Betis (as claimed) that they are "un peuple porté plutôt sur les frivolités de la danse, les extravagances du lit, les joies de la table." Any informed Cameroonian knows that this is Mongo Beti's description of his own people (1986:120). To make this concocted letter look real the author deemed Bamilekes as "tough, business-like and dynamic", the same weapons to be used in gaining political power as well as crushing Betis. Keen observers of Cameroon politics easily relate this hard-boiled politics to Biya's gift of a lion, matchet, and spear by his kinsmen at the end of his provincial tours in Yaounde on October 4, 1991. President Biya was reminded of the necessity of war if other ethnic groups insist on contesting his authority and legitimacy. Challenge Hebdo No. 43 of October 8, 1991 interpreted Biya as assuring his tribesfolks that "I will cut off his head (anyone who jokes with me) with this matchet you have given me. let anyone try." The undemocratic tendency of ethnic groups viewing themselves as the best and others as unpatriotic is unhealthy. This tendency was worsened when President Biya congratulated betis in the same breath for being always loyal, never exchanging their loyalty for money or for government resources. In the same light elites of the Centre South Province wrote to Biya on June 11, 1991, in a motion of support claiming to have the unique and peculiar quality of being loyal "defenders of Cameroon's constitutional order." They said this spirit was inborn in them or their natural tendency which could be "proven historically and empirically." Hence, Victor Kamga (1995:101) interpreted them to mean other ethnic groups were either "rebels", "maquisards" or outright "mercenaries". This pathological
ethnic conflict in Cameroon vindicates Esman's claim (1975:395) that the
proportion and quality of conflict and cooperation between groups depends
on 3 factors namely: (1) the relative resources at each group's disposition,
resources here could be demographic, organizational, economic, technological,
locational (minerals, etc.), political and ideological; (2) congruity
in goals between those who control state apparatus and group leaders also
important in determining group relationship; and (3) rules and institutions,
structures, procedures for conflict management. Crisis Political Economy All established "democracies" are located in countries in which economic production and accumulation are in the hands of privately-owned firms and in which distribution is mainly effected through market mechanisms. Thus, the inescapable conclusion is that (1) capitalism is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for democracy; and (2) capitalism is to be modified to negotiate democratic imperatives. But the political economy of Cameroon is that of crisis. Its legacy is that of corruption, price distortions, foreign indebtedness, inefficient public enterprises, trade imbalances, unemployment, fiscal instability, underdevelopment and dependence. And the first official reaction is exaggerated dependence on foreign models and advice with unforseen interaction effects. Politics have always played a major role in many governments more or less heavy-handed involvement in economics. Through control of economic resources, the Cameroon government believes it has kept a tight lid on political dissent. And its political commitment to liberalization and economic reform has been less than comprehensive and genuine. Thus the government's privatization simply will not work. For one thing, the government has not yet enacted new laws to allow for personnel shifts, management chances, asset valuations and pricing, incentive schemes and accounting systems that will enable a bureaucracy to become an efficient, autonomous corporation. For another, the policy option has been that of the pauperization of Cameroon masses. French magazine Marchés Tropicaux of April 15, 1994, states that "in all countries of the Franc Zone, Cameroon is the one which has inflicted draconian treatment of its civil servants with two consecutive salary cuts of 30% in January and of 50% in November." Unemployment, according to the magazine stands at 48%; purchasing power has reduced by 70%, inflation has attained an alarming proportion of 48%; the growth rate dangles at -11%; and GDP has dropped by 28.9% since 1986. In sum, economic activity had dropped to -11.2% by 1994 and continues to slide down. Apparently, the government's prescription is for the poverty-ridden Cameroonian masses to wait passively for its messianic industrialists to deliver them from their misery. In other words, the government at bottom has "evolved" a theory of political inertia, for political power to devolve into the hand of a small, cohesive and relatively closed ethnic die-hards which not withstanding democratization struggles, controls all decisions of major importance and is virtually invulnerable to 112 opposition parties". It is capable of forestalling any changes potentially threatening to its monopoly of power. It is therefore noteworthy that the relationship between Cameroon's underdeveloped capitalism and democracy is structural. It stems from the difference between a democratic polity that promises to distribute power and status relatively equally and an underdeveloped economy that distributes poverty to the poor and property and income relatively unequally to the rich. Populism,
driven by the disappointment of rising expectations and disenchantment
with the travels of democratization is here and now. But it can deliver
no immediate rewards to the Cameroonian masses. Politicization, Radicalization and Militarization of Ethnicity In the face of the generic dilemmas playing Cameroon, politicians are escaping to settle on rules and practices for resolving them. Rather, they have tossed aside democracy and sued for "ethnic politics" (Nnoli, 1988). And the politicization, radicalization and militarization of ethnicity has been raised to creed. First, politicization of ethnicity as well as the ethnicization of politics in Cameroon has taken several forms in the 1990s. The most glaring one is the use of "strategies of cultural separation to consolidate power and control" (Kaarsholm, 1994:34). Hence, people tend to ethnicization of politics by seeking "refuge in modes of cultural identification and differentiation in order to defend themselves against uneven consequences of modernity rather than enjoy its unsettling and liberating effects." Another aspect is that the politicization of ethnicity is less of sentiment than of the "impetus to organize in order to get what the state is distributing" (Petersen 1980:19). Thus, the tendency has been that decisions that affect the community are not taken disinterestedly. But ethnic considerations play a determinant or significant role. This is what forces other ethnic groups to organize themselves as a consequence for an "ethnic grasp of state resources" or a defense against others (bell, 1975:171). The mere suggestion of the subject of privatization warms the hearts of investment bankers, lawyers, consultants and foreign investors. But privatization provokes the opposite reaction among Cameroonians. This is especially the case here because the public's confidence in the government is very low and corruption is perceived as a normal part of the political process. Is the sceptical Cameroon public's conventional wisdom correct? Are unemployment, corruption, and skulduggery the inevitable offspring of today's privatization? Many Cameroonians know that monopolistic public ownership of enterprises went without any accountability and competition from the private sector. This ownership was so inefficient that it almost invariably led to nepotism and political playoffs, bloated payrolls, poor service and inefficiency. Perceptions of widespread corruption have fomented popular discontent in Cameroon, where the nomenklatura and the managers of state firms are perceived to have geared the privatization process for their own personal and ethnic aims. This perception has contributed to the political controversy that has helped bring the privatization of large state firms to a virtual standstill. On March 29, 1995, the Cameroon government stepped in to cancel an under-the-table deal to sell cut-price shares in the state cotton company, one of 15 firms slated to be privatized. Finance Minister Justin Ndioro declared the sales of a total of nearly 205,000 shares (48% of the capital) "illegal" and invalid. The government claims that "the sales of the SODECOTON shares were carried out outside the legal and institutional framework for privatisation in Cameroon." The shares had been sold at between 1000 and 9000 frs within northern government circles for a fraction of their real value in 1992 as a trade-off for votes during the Presidential election. The new element is that financial experts in Yaounde think that the sales were less than a seventh of their potential value. Thus, criticism of privatization is related to the perception of ethnic groups who benefit or lose on the ownership transfers. However, manual labourers, uncertified professionals, farmers and the unemployed are more likely than other social groups to regard privatization as mostly profitable for swindlers--foreign or domestic. Second, the clamour for democracy has fuelled the radicalization of ethnicity. For example, since the frantic move to save the Biya regime from putschists in 1984, there has been a consistent drive towards giving it a base which draws unconditionally from "Beti" ethnic support. This drive was attested to by the contradictory statements made by the Ministry of Information and Culture in a pamphlet titled "Le Coup d'Etat Manqué du 6 Avril 1984." The Ministry argued that the Republican Guard which staged the abortive coup d'état was made up of troops and officers from the former province of the North, Ahidjo's region of origin. The statement went on to stress that in order to maintain the loyalty of the Republican Guard, Ahidjo gave them exclusive privileges such as rapid promotions, very high salary scales, lodging and various subsidies (Ministère de l'Information et de la Culture de la République du Cameroun, "Le Coup d'Etat Manqué du 6 Avril 1984," p. 10). By this accusation the Ministry fanned the North-South Cleavage which led to the hot pursuit and massacre of northerners ("la chase aux Haoussas"). Apparently such declarations as well as the attendant killings were later on seen to have been in error. In an apparently self-redeeming speech on April 10, 1984, to the nation, ... history has recorded that the forces which remained loyal were made of Cameroonians from the four corners of the country without distinction as to their tribe, region or religion. Responsibility for he coup attempt can be apportioned to a power-hungry, ambitious minority and not to this or that religion. Furthermore, radicalization of ethnicity takes the form of undermining democracy. That is, Biya's ethnically exclusive regime vehemently resists any "change that will bring its ethnic opponents to power by democratic processes" (Horowitz, 1993:21). The regime is too sensitive to the fact that "democracy is demography" and as a consequence it fears that other ethnic groups will have a demographic advantage in a democratic regime. Third, regime insecurity has given birth to the militarization of ethnicity in Cameroon. This militarization has taken two forms. One of them has been to recruit into the army a disproportionately large number of people from President Biya's ethnic group and give them diversified military training and weaponry. The militarization of ethnicity is undergoing internationalization with the creation of multiple French security services in Cameroon. The case of Africa Security is revelative. According to Africa Confidential of March 3, 1995, Africa Security employs 1300 guards most of whom are from the Beti ethnic group. Militant opposition groups are suspicious of the security guards because they are well equipped with armoured four-wheel drive vehicles, two-way radios and 12 caliber guns that they carry openly within the ambit of Cameroon's gun laws. A combination of the experience and muscle of French security services as "Service d'Action Civique", Africa Security, etc. could prove lethal to democratization and ethnic harmony through the country. Another strategy of militarization has been to grow up an ethnic militia. This ethnic militia is split into units such as Action Directe, Autodefense, L'Armée Pour La Libération du Peuple Beti, Croix du Sang, etc. These militia units burn down markets, official buildings, and gun down political opponents of the regime. The use of such militia retards and distorts democracy. It hampers democratic demands for justice and accountability. In 1991, for example, the local Beti in Yaounde declared war against university students of "Anglo-Bami" origin who were purported to be protesting and trying to seize power from the Betis. Thereafter, many torture centres were created besides the official police centres. The most famous being that of one Manda Fils near Chappelle d'Obili where "enemy" students were forced to snif toxic ammonia gas, drink muddy water and undergo serious beatings. This general state of insecurity sparked off a mass exodus of students from their Bonamoussadi residential area in 1991. Lectures were automatically suspended and only resumed more than one month later after government proffered threats that anyone not attending lectures would be considered dismissed or having withdrawn. Indeed, the ethnic heterogeneity of Cameroon is frequently cited as a basic obstacle to democratization. Diatribes of all hues against tribalism recur, with almost monotonous notoriety and regularity in writings on Cameroon. Their concern is with unity, thereby reflecting their belief that such "primordial sentiments inevitably detract from the tasks of democratization". To weld together "a melange of peoples of widely varying primordial attachments into a new and larger "terminal community" appears to be the basic task, without the accomplishment of which democratization cannot proceed either rapidly or efficiently.12 In Cameroon, ethnic sentiments have been quickened, not quieted, by multiparty democratization. Yet ethnic sentiments or "tribalism" had been condemned by the 1958 All-African Peoples Conference for its reactionary character and sordid support for colonialism. Tribalism was viewed as an evil practice which constituted a serious obstacle to (1) the realisation of the unity of Africa; (ii) the political evolution of Africa; and (iii) the rapid liberation of Africa. Its institutions actually supported colonialism and constituted the organs of corruption, exploitation and repression which strangled the dignity, personality and the will of the African to emancipate himself.13 Today, one may agree with Eisenstadt that "All traditional or tribal frameworks are necessarily the most significant determinants of the degree of adjustment or adaptation to modern conditions".14 Thus, ethnocentrism and democratization are obvious rivals in the heterogeneous state of Cameroon. This trend is consequent upon the ruralization of ethnicity and ethnic conflict, a phenomenon usually associated.
At first glance, Cameroonian politics presents a chaotic scene to the political analyst. Demonstrations, riots, clashes with the police, electoral irregularities, bitter ethnic conflicts and cleansing, government's desperate attempts to disinform and misinform, etc, are common currency. The phenomenon of ethnic exclusion has been rampant in the official media. The harrowing experiences of Anglophone journalists are legend. Considered by the Biya regime as an ethnic group and treated as such in the allocation of appointive posts, they are often viewed with skepticism. For example, on May 27, 1991, Prime Minister Sadou Hayatou sent a confidential letter No. B1019/SG/PM to the General Manager of Cameroon Radio-Television (CRTV). The letter states, inter alia: I have the honour to ask you to verify this situation and where such cases exist, to address a severe warning to such staff, who must not continue to reduce a public utility to a private publication given up to question Government action. There are reasons to be less then triumphal about the longer-term prospects for President Biya's "advanced democracy" in Cameroon. Ethnic politics has inevitably led to declining economic performance, accelerating inflation, heavy doses of economic performance, accelerating inflation, heavy doses of foreign debts, acute budgetary and fiscal imbalances, etc. These problems demonstrate that the fundamental structural dilemmas concerning capitalist institutions remain unresolved. What is most striking is that Cameroonians have responded to these dilemmas of choice and strains of economic and political adjustments by focusing their discontent on ethnic animosities rather than on democracy as such. Nevertheless, these problems of economic suffering and political disappointment pale when compared to those generated by ethnic conflicts. Ahidjo's autocracy suppressed and/or manipulated ethnic groups to his personal political advantage. But Biya inherited ethnic diversities and nursed ethnic resentments while foreclosing the environment in which they can be peacefully aired. And in Cameroon where historical resentments (Francophone-Anglophone ethnic) run deep and existing political frontiers run through rather than around the country, ethnic divisions are becoming explosive and easily overwhelm the usual social cleavages of class, status, profession, generation, and the like, that underlie democratic party and interest-group systems. This is why Cameroon will face more formidable dilemmas as well as make more arduous choices before dreaming of settling into routinized patterns of political cooperation and competition that will ensure the perpetuation of democratic rule. These formidable dilemmas and arduous choices will recognize but not institutionalize the ethnic calculus as the modal pattern of political interactions.
1 - Crawford Young, "Patterns of Social Conflict: State, Class, and Ethnicity, Daedalus III (1982) : 71-98; Rothchild, D. and Dorunsola, V.A., eds., State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas (Boulder, Celo. Westviews, 1983). 2 - Imbert, Jean, Le Cameroun, Paris, PUF Collection. Que sais-je?, 1979, p. 126. 3 - Fongui, Jean Pierre, L'integration Politique Au Cameroun, PUF, Paris 1988, p. 41. 4 - Cot. J-Pet Mounir, J-P, Pour Une Sociologie Politique, Tome I, Collection Points, Editions du Seuil, 1974, p. 34. 5 - Le Vine, V.T., The Cameroons: From Mandate to Independence, California: University of California Press, 1964, p. 36. 6 - Rudin, H., Germans in the Cameroons, 1884-1914: A Case study in Modern Imperialism. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938, p. 189. 7 - See Ngoh, V.J., Cameroon 1884-1985. A Hundred years of History, Navi-Group Publications, 1988, p. 42. 10 - Williard R. Johnson, The Cameroon Federation: Political Integration in a Fragmentary Society (Princeton:Princeton University press, 1970), p. 70. 11 - Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New Nations", in Geertz, ed., Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc. 1963), pp. 105-57. 12 - James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr. eds., Political Parties and National Integration in Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964), p. 688. 13 - cf. Colin Legum, Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962) p. 235. 14 - S.N. Eisenstadt, "Social Change and Modernization in African Societies", in William H. Lewis, ed., French-Speaking Africa: The Search for Identity (New York: Walker and Co., 1965), p. 233.
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